Juan Perez
28th October 2000, 02:02
With the recent increase of attention given towards Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and Operations Other Than War (OOTW), the Army has placed more resources towards the Tactics, Techniques and Proceedures (TTPs) of both Basic and Advanced MOUT. However, I have found that despite the increase in training and fund allocation towards this end (to include the adoption of the M-4 and its FORCE-MOD system and the increased used of Simunition), the light infantry soldier has an inherent misunderstanding of the use and capabilities of demo charges towards this end.
Case in point: Despite numereous block of instructions geared towards the practical use of demo in MOUT (to include a MOUT specific demo range), some soldiers were caught rigging the M-81 fuse igniter directly to DETCORD just prior to initiating detonation of silhouette charges as opposed to utilizing MDI M14 time fuse, or the old M700 version (which seems to be more reliable... but that's another issue). It seems that currently the specialty of demolitions is left at the doorstep of the light combat engineer (Sapper). This seems almost natural since it is right up the engineer's alley. However, there seems to be a lack of willingness to accept the responsibility (on the light infantry soldier-leaders part) to truly take the TTPs of demo use to heart. The Ranger Regiment is an exception hence they don't receive direct support from "slice" units such as the Sappers and develop their own highly capable specialty demo teams in accordance with SH 21-76.
The problem is that the same Sapper that is used to breach into the objective (i.e., building, or mine/wire/booby-trapped obstacle), is expected to survive and make it to the individual structures and assist the light infantry in taking a foothold and securing the same. However, the survivability of the Sapper at the breach is somewhere at the 50% margin. Essentially, half of those demolition experts might not be there to "kick in the door" for the clearing team (or squad). I think the ARTEP battle drills (i.e. FM 7-8) need to include in-depth demo use in and therefore serve to inculcate infantry leadership to emphasize its use in CQB. Otherwise, the desire to follow "doctrine" to the letter will keep the soldiers' training locked in the Field Manual.
Looking at the difficulty that the Russians had in Chechnya, where it took nearly four years to secure one large city, it seems that all aspects of MOUT need to be studied a lot more closely than what seems to be the case.
[Edited by Juan Perez, Jr. on 11-09-2000 at 07:48 AM]
Case in point: Despite numereous block of instructions geared towards the practical use of demo in MOUT (to include a MOUT specific demo range), some soldiers were caught rigging the M-81 fuse igniter directly to DETCORD just prior to initiating detonation of silhouette charges as opposed to utilizing MDI M14 time fuse, or the old M700 version (which seems to be more reliable... but that's another issue). It seems that currently the specialty of demolitions is left at the doorstep of the light combat engineer (Sapper). This seems almost natural since it is right up the engineer's alley. However, there seems to be a lack of willingness to accept the responsibility (on the light infantry soldier-leaders part) to truly take the TTPs of demo use to heart. The Ranger Regiment is an exception hence they don't receive direct support from "slice" units such as the Sappers and develop their own highly capable specialty demo teams in accordance with SH 21-76.
The problem is that the same Sapper that is used to breach into the objective (i.e., building, or mine/wire/booby-trapped obstacle), is expected to survive and make it to the individual structures and assist the light infantry in taking a foothold and securing the same. However, the survivability of the Sapper at the breach is somewhere at the 50% margin. Essentially, half of those demolition experts might not be there to "kick in the door" for the clearing team (or squad). I think the ARTEP battle drills (i.e. FM 7-8) need to include in-depth demo use in and therefore serve to inculcate infantry leadership to emphasize its use in CQB. Otherwise, the desire to follow "doctrine" to the letter will keep the soldiers' training locked in the Field Manual.
Looking at the difficulty that the Russians had in Chechnya, where it took nearly four years to secure one large city, it seems that all aspects of MOUT need to be studied a lot more closely than what seems to be the case.
[Edited by Juan Perez, Jr. on 11-09-2000 at 07:48 AM]