In light of what will no doubt be an avalanche of maudlin emoting about the nobility of the samurai following “The Last Samurai”, I thought these excerpts might be of interest. They are meant to tease and I recommend the whole article; I’ve cut out some very interesting stuff, not the least of which concerns his studies of battle injury reports (cited approvingly by Karl Friday on Iaido-L) and what they imply about warfare and attitudes. I’m looking forward to reading Conlan’s book when it hits the shelves. The whole articles is at: http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~rijs/Con...aper%20PDF.pdf

The Culture of Force and Farce: Fourteenth-Century Japanese Warfare by Thomas Conlan, Ph.D.

Department of History & Asian Studies Program Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011 tel: (207) 725-3507 fax: (207) 725-3059 email: tconlan@bowdoin.edu Harvard University

Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Occasional Papers in Japanese Studies Number 2000-01 January 2000. This paper was presented on September 24, 1999, at the Japan Forum, a lecture series sponsored by the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University.

“....The medieval Japanese warrior would be bewildered by the concept of the unknown soldier. For him, or her, the essence of warfare was recognition, for from it stemmed fame, honor, and rewards; without it there was little point of fighting at all....

“[W]hy have the wars of the fourteenth century languished in obscurity while those of the twelfth have achieved wide fame? One answer is simple: the warriors of the fourteenth century fought with an idealized memory of the earlier conflict. Many were blind to the "newness" of their age and instead saw it as a rehash of the glories of 1180. By their following too closely the script of the past, the epic of the twelfth century occurred, as it were, twice: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce....

“The warriors of the fourteenth century set themselves up for disappointment because they modeled their behavior on unattainable, idealized goals by following a script that was a hundred and fifty years old....

“The next aspect of warfare that I attempt to characterize as farce consists of the fact that war was fought out of a desire for personal glory, or what we might call more mercenary gain. One sees no overriding sense of sacrifice for a higher cause. This does not mean that warfare was less "real," for men and women were killed -- sometimes in great numbers -- but absent is the urgency of a crusade or a seriousness of a higher goal....

“[T]he Yüki, fought for the Southern Court and were lavishly rewarded. When they switched allegiance to the Northern Court they had a strong bargaining position and were able to keep all of the lands they had received from the Southern court. If a warrior could pick a winner, and "jump ship" before it was too late, switching sides could prove to be quite beneficial.

“It was wise for a warrior to abandon a losing general or a lost cause in order to preserve his family's holdings. A warrior who switched sides was not rebuked or condemned. Customarily, a warrior would lose anywhere from one third to one half of his holdings upon surrender, but this was observed more in the breach than in reality.

“Absolute loyalty was not expected of independent, land-holding warriors, although it was for their hereditary retainers....

“The burden was on generals to attract warriors. This could be accomplished only through generosity in distributing awards, and, most important of all, through victory in battle. Without victory, and enemy lands to confiscate, few would fight....

“So what of the so-called samurai loyalty, one might justifiably wonder. Warriors were not obliged to follow any lord in death. Indeed, they really didn't have any lord at all. It is fallacious to speak of treachery, or disloyalty, for loyalty was not expected or demanded of warriors at this time....

“Warriors did not fight for a lord; instead their deeds required compensation....If they did not receive adequate compensation, they would take their services elsewhere and fight for a rival commander capable of offering better....

“In order for awards to accrue to one's self, it was essential that others see and recognize one's brave acts. For example, in 1331, a certain Kamakura warrior named Hitomi On'na crept into the midst of enemy forces and cried out his name in a loud voice only to be instantly killed. Clearly, he did not believe discretion to be the better part of valor. Instead, Hitomi wanted to win glory by being the first warrior killed fighting for Kamakura. He left a name for posterity, and his surviving relatives would undoubtedly have received considerable rewards if the regime he had fought for had not been subsequently annihilated....

“Heads were also important proofs of battle service. Those who were successful tended to abandon the battlefield, already in possession of the ultimate proof of valor. The need for heads proved problematic for generals, for troops would leave the fray. Orders were issued, stating that men were to refrain from cutting off heads and instead rely upon witnesses for proof of their kill. In these circumstances, warriors discarded heads once their valor had been witnessed....

“Religious institutions played a vital role, for they served as conduits to the gods. Their prayers could influence and alter the chain of causality; hence religion could not exist separate from any sphere, including politics and war. Priests, like warriors, submitted petitions demanding reward. Some physically fought in battle while others performed maledictions. No great distinction was made between wielding weapons or muttering curses....Religion thus cannot be separated from violence; nor can prayers be conceived as being invariably and inherently non-violent. Nevertheless, the proper role of religion became increasingly contested as time progressed, and some Zen monks in particular began criticizing the maledictions performed by the esoteric Tendai and Shingon sects.”